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Humans are endowed with a rich repertoire of cognitive abilities. Many of these are 
shared with other animals, while a few appear to be unique to our species. Among the 
latter is our ability to translate complex thoughts into language, a code that allows us to 
exchange those thoughts with one another, plausibly laying the foundation of human 
culture and civilization. Given that language evolved against the backdrop of many 
evolutionarily older systems and mechanisms, a natural question arises as to the degree to 
which our language system is separable from other cognitive systems. In particular, does 
language rely on a set of specialized brain regions, or does it share neural machinery with 
other functions? Based on converging evidence from neuroimaging studies and 
investigations of individuals with aphasia, we here argue that a set of brain regions on the 
lateral surfaces of the left frontal and temporal cortices selectively support high-level 
linguistic processing. We therefore conclude that language is separable from the rest of 
the cognitive arsenal in the adult human brain. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Many non-human animals – ranging from those genetically similar to us, like 
chimpanzees (e.g., Call, 2001; Tomasello et al., 2003; Hurley & Nudds, 2006; Penn & 
Povinelli, 2007; Matsuzawa, 2009; Whiten, 2011) and bonobos (e.g., Hare & Yamamoto, 
2015; Roffman et al., 2015), to our more distant relatives, like marine mammals (e.g., 
Herman, Pack & Morrel-Samuels, 1993; Reiss & Marino, 2001; Schusterman, Thomas & 
Wood, 2013) or birds (e.g., Bluff et al., 2007; Taylor et al., 2007) – are capable of 
complex thoughts and behaviors. Furthermore, all animal species have a way to exchange 
information with one another (e.g., Kaplan, 2014). These communication systems are 
highly variable in their media, scope, and complexity (e.g., Endler, 1993; Hauser, 1997; 
Hauser & Konishi, 1999; Bradbury & Vehrencamp, 2011). Most would agree, however, 
that human language is unparalleled in the animal kingdom in its complexity and 
generative power (e.g., Snowdon, 1990; Deacon, 1997; Hauser et al., 2002; Premack, 
2007; Kinsella, 2009). Of course, language is a relatively recent development on the 
evolutionary timescale, having emerged only 100,000-200,000 years ago (e.g., Atkinson 
2011; Perreault & Mathew, 2012; cf., for example, our divergence from chimpanzees, 
which occurred between 5 and 7 million years ago; Kumar et al., 2005). Consequently, 
much of our cognitive and neural machinery was already in place when the language 
system evolved. To date, however, debates continue as to the relationship between 
language and other cognitive abilities. These debates concern a number of distinct 
questions, and some have been perhaps unnecessarily heated due to the conflation of 
some of the relevant issues, as we discuss in Section 4. We here tackle one specific 
question: does language processing rely on its own specialized brain regions or does it 
instead make use of machinery that is also used to perform other cognitive tasks? Note 
that we are here concerned with mature human brains. We touch on the role of language 
in the development of specifically human cognitive competences in Section 4. 
 
Two methods most directly speak to the question of whether there exist brain regions that 
are selectively engaged during language processing. The first is functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI), which can be used to examine co-activation between 
language and other cognitive processes. If a brain region supports both linguistic 
processing, and, say, musical processing, then it should be active during tasks tapping 
both of these cognitive processes. If, on the other hand, a brain region selectively 
supports linguistic processing, then it should be active when people process language, 
and much less so, or not at all, when people process music. The second method relies on 
individuals with acquired brain damage and allows us to ask whether damage to the 
language system affects performance in other domains. If the language system – or some 
of its components – are critical for arithmetic processing or processing structure in music, 
then damage to these brain regions should lead to deficits in these non-linguistic abilities. 
If, on the other hand, the language system is not necessary for non-linguistic abilities, 
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then focal damage to the language system should only affect language comprehension 
and/or production, leaving intact performance on non-linguistic tasks. 
 
We here review evidence from these two methodologies, occasionally drawing on data 
from other approaches, focusing on the relationship between language and five other 
cognitive abilities that have been argued – over the years – to share cognitive and neural 
machinery with language: arithmetic processing, executive functions, Theory of Mind, 
music processing, and spatial navigation. The nature of and the reasons for the alleged 
overlap between linguistic and other processes have varied across domains. In particular, 
the hypothesized overlap comes in at least two flavors. In some cases, language has been 
argued to share representations and/or computations with other domains. For example, 
language, music and arithmetic all rely on structured representations characterized by 
features like compositionality and recursion (e.g., Hauser et al., 2002) or complex 
hierarchical structure (e.g., Maess et al., 2001; Patel, 2003; Maruyama et al., 2012). In the 
case of Theory of Mind, some aspects of linguistic syntax have been argued by some to 
be a critical component of our representations of others’ mental states (e.g., De Villiers & 
De Villiers, 2000). Language also shares some cognitive requirements with domain-
general executive functions like inhibition (e.g., Novick et al., 2005). 
 
However, in other cases, linguistic representations have been hypothesized to play a key 
role in other domains in spite of the fact that there may be no similarity whatsoever 
between the representations in the two domains. In particular, language has been argued 
to serve as a medium for integrating information across various specialized systems (e.g., 
Hermer & Spelke, 1999; Carruthers, 2005). In this way, in addition to their role in 
interpersonal communication, language representations have a significant intra-cognitive 
role. This kind of relationship was, for example, hypothesized to hold between language 
and spatial navigation (e.g., Hermer & Spelke, 1999). 
 
We argue, based on the available evidence, that in a mature human brain a set of regions 
– most prominently, those located on the lateral surfaces of the left frontal and temporal 
cortices – selectively support linguistic processing, and damage to these regions affects 
an individual’s ability to understand and produce language, but not to engage in a wide 
variety of complex non-linguistic tasks. 
 
Before we proceed, it is important to clarify what we mean by “language”. There are two 
points to make here. First, we are focusing on high-level language processing, which 
includes extracting meaning from linguistic utterances and generating meaningful 
linguistic utterances when communicating with others (e.g., Fedorenko et al., 2010; 
regions schematically marked in red in Fig. 1, adapted from Fedorenko & Thompson-
Schill, 2014). We are thus excluding from consideration i) auditory and visual perceptual 
regions concerned with the initial analysis of linguistic signals (marked in yellow and 
green in Fig. 1, respectively), as well as ii) articulatory motor regions concerned with the 
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latest stages of speech production (marked in pink in Fig. 1). Of course, the question we 
ask here about the high-level language processing regions can be – and has been – asked 
with respect to those lower-level perceptual / motor regions. Briefly: it appears that some 
degree of specificity characterizes both auditory (e.g., Overath et al., 2015; Peretz et al., 
2015; Norman-Haignere et al., 2015) and visual (e.g., Baker et al., 2007; Hamame et al., 
2013) perceptual regions. The answer is somewhat equivocal for the motor regions, and 
the degree of functional specificity of parts of motor / pre-motor cortex for speech 
production over other motor behaviors, like non-speech oral movements, remains 
unclear. Some have argued for such specificity in parts of the speech articulation system 
– specifically, the superior precentral gyrus of the insula – based on patient evidence 
(e.g., Dronkers, 1996; cf. Hillis et al., 2004), but findings from fMRI generally do not 
support this claim (e.g., Bonilha et al., 2006; Fedorenko et al., 2014). Yet, dissociations 
between speech production and the production of non-speech oral movements have been 
reported (e.g., Whiteside et al., 2015). Furthermore, a recent fMRI study (Longcamp et 
al., 2014) has reported selectivity for letters over non-letter symbols in written 
production. Thus, the question clearly deserves further investigation. 
 
And second, although high-level language processing subsumes many potentially distinct 
computations, we here talk about it holistically. To elaborate: language comprehension 
and production can each be broken down into many mental operations (e.g., during 
comprehension, we need to recognize the words, understand how the words relate to one 
another by analyzing the morphological endings and/or word order, and construct a 
complex meaning representation). These operations must, at least to some extent, be 
temporally separable, with some preceding others (e.g., Swinney et al., 1997; Fodor, 
1983; Marslen-Wilson, 1987), although the top-down effects of predictive processing are 
well accepted (e.g., Maslen-Wilson, 1975; Altman & Kamide, 1999; Hale, 2001; DeLong 
et al., 2005; VanBerkum et al., 2005; Dikker et al., 2005; Levy, 2008; Smith & Levy, 
2013). It is also possible that these different operations are spatially separable, being 
implemented in distinct parts of the language network. Indeed, some results from the 
neuropsychological patient literature suggest that this must be the case (e.g., Caramazza, 
1990; cf. Plaut, 1995). However, no compelling evidence exists, in our opinion, for either 
i) a consistent relationship between particular brain regions and particular mental 
operations in the patient literature, or ii) for the spatial separability of different 
components of high-level language processing in fMRI (e.g., Fedorenko et al., 2012c; 
Blank et al., 2015; Bautista & Wilson, 2016). Moreover, the language processing brain 
regions form a deeply integrated functional system, as evidenced by both a) strong 
anatomical connectivity (e.g., Saur et al., 2008), and b) high correlations in neural 
activity over time during both rest and naturalistic cognition (e.g., Blank et al., 2014; Tie 
et al., 2014). Thus, we here consider the high-level language processing system as a 
whole, without discussing particular brain regions within it. 
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We now proceed to review the evidence for the separability of the brain regions that 
support high-level language processing from those that support other cognitive abilities. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. A schematic illustration of the approximate locations of brain regions that 
support perceptual (yellow, green), motor (pink) and high-level (red) aspects of language 
processing. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Functional response profiles of two high-level language processing brain 
regions. 
(a). Two functional “parcels” derived from a group-level representation of 
language activations (the LIFG and the LMidPostTemp parcels from Fedorenko et al., 
2010) and used to constrain the selection of subject-specific voxels. Individual regions of 
interest were functionally defined: each parcel was intersected with the individual 
activation map for the language localizer contrast (sentences > nonword lists; Fedorenko 
et al., 2010) and top 10% of voxels were taken to be that participant’s ROI. 
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(b). Responses to the language localizer conditions and a broad range of non-linguistic 
tasks. Responses to the sentences and nonwords conditions were estimated using across-
runs cross validation (e.g., Nieto-Castañon & Fedorenko, 2012), so that the data to define 
the ROIs and to estimate their responses were independent. The data for the arithmetic, 
working memory (WM) and cognitive control (MSIT) tasks were reported in 
Fedorenko et al. (2011), and the data for the music conditions come from Norman-
Haignere et al. (in preparation; see also Fedorenko et al., 2011, 2012). 
 
 
2. Review of the evidence 
 
2.1 Language vs. arithmetic processing 
 
Previous work in numerical cognition has identified two distinct core systems underlying 
different aspects of numerical competence: i) a small exact number system, which is 
based on attention and allows the tracking of small quantities of objects with exact 
information about position and identity (e.g., Wynn, 1990; Xu et al., 2004; Feigenson et 
al., 2004); and ii) a large approximate number system (sometimes referred to as the 
analog magnitude estimation system), which provides noisy estimates of large sets (e.g., 
Whalen et al., 1999). These core abilities are shared across species (e.g., Gallistel, 1990; 
Hauser and Carey, 2003) and are present in pre-linguistic infants (Feigenson et al., 2004). 
Consequently, the autonomy of language from these core numerical abilities has not been 
controversial. 
 
However, in addition to these evolutionarily conserved systems, humans have developed 
means to represent exact quantities of arbitrary set size, using verbal representations (i.e., 
words for numbers). Although not universal (e.g., Gordon et al., 2002; Pica et al., 2004; 
Frank et al., 2008), this ability to represent exact quantities is present in most cultures. 
Because these representations are verbal in nature, it has been proposed that exact 
arithmetic relies on the neural system that underlies linguistic processing (e.g., Dehaene, 
2003). Indeed, neuroimaging studies and studies in bilingual speakers provided some 
evidence in support of this view (e.g., Dehaene & Cohen, 1997; Dehaene et al., 1999; 
Stanescu-Cosson et al., 2000; Van Harskamp & Cipolotti, 2001; Delazer et al., 2003). For 
example, Dehaene and colleagues (1999) had participants perform an exact vs. 
approximate arithmetic addition task. The exact > approximate contrast produced 
activation in a number of brain regions including parts of the left inferior frontal cortex 
(although the observed region fell quite anteriorly to “Broca’s area” as defined 
traditionally). Based on the fact that other studies have found inferior frontal activations 
for verbal / linguistic tasks, Dehaene et al. argued that the regional activations they 
observed reflected engagement of the language system in exact calculations. Such 
indirect inferences can be dangerous, however: similar activation locations across studies 
– especially when operating at the level of coarse anatomy (e.g., talking about activations 
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landing within “the inferior frontal gyrus”, “the superior temporal sulcus” or “the angular 
gyrus”, each of which encompasses many cubic centimeters of brain tissue) – cannot be 
used to conclude that the same brain region gave rise to the relevant activation patterns. 
For example, both faces and bodies produce robust responses within the fusiform gyrus, 
yet clear evidence exists of category selectivity for each type of stimulus in distinct, 
though nearby, regions (e.g., Schwarzlose et al., 2005). To make the strongest case for 
overlap, one would therefore need to, at the very least, directly compare the relevant 
cognitive functions within the same study, and ideally, within each brain individually 
(e.g., Fedorenko et al., 2010) because inter-individual variability can give rise to apparent 
overlap at the group level even when the activations are entirely non-overlapping in any 
given individual (e.g., Nieto-Castañon & Fedorenko, 2012). 
 
A neuropsychological investigation that is characterized by a similar problematic 
inference was reported by Baldo & Dronkers (2006), who examined a large set of 
individuals with left hemisphere strokes and found a) a correlation in performance 
between a language comprehension task and an arithmetic task, and b) overlap in brain 
regions whose damage was associated with linguistic and arithmetic deficits (including in 
the left inferior frontal gyrus). As has been discussed extensively in the literature in the 
1980s and 1990s (e.g., Coltheart, 1985; Shallice, 1988), however, dissociations are more 
powerful than associations because an association can arise from damage to nearby but 
distinct regions. Curiously, Baldo & Dronkers actually observe a dissociation in their 
data, with some patients being impaired on the language comprehension task but not 
arithmetic comprehension, and other patients showing the opposite pattern of results. 
However, they take their overall results as evidence of overlap in the mechanisms for 
processing language and arithmetic. 
 
A major challenge to the view that the language system underlies our exact arithmetic 
abilities came from a study where patients with extensive damage to left-hemisphere 
language regions and with consequent severe aphasia were shown to have preserved 
ability to perform exact arithmetic (Varley et al., 2005). In particular, three such patients 
were able to solve a variety of mathematical problems that involved addition, subtraction, 
multiplication and division, small and large numbers, whole numbers and fractions, and 
expressions with brackets. Particularly astonishing was the dissociation in these patients 
between their lack of sensitivity to structural information in language vs. mathematical 
expressions: although profoundly agrammatic in language, they retained knowledge of 
features such as the embedded structure of bracket expressions and the significance of 
order information in non-commutative math operations of subtraction and division. This 
study strongly suggested that brain regions that support linguistic, including grammatical, 
processing are not needed for exact arithmetic. 
 
A number of brain imaging studies have provided converging evidence for this view. An 
early PET study (Zago et al., 2001) examined the activation patterns during simple digit 
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reading, retrieval of simple arithmetic facts, and arithmetic computations, and failed to 
observe any activation in the perisylvian cortices. More recently, Fedorenko, Behr & 
Kanwisher (2011) had participants perform a language understanding task in fMRI, 
which was used to localize language-responsive regions of interest in each participant 
individually. They then examined the responses of these brain regions while participants 
engaged in solving easier (with smaller numbers) or harder (with larger numbers) 
arithmetic addition problems. They found that the language regions responded during the 
arithmetic conditions at the same level as, or below, a low-level baseline condition (i.e., 
when participants did not engage in any task; Fig. 2), strongly suggesting that the 
language system is not active when we engage in exact arithmetic. Similarly, Monti, 
Parsons & Osherson (2012) found that linguistic, but not algebraic, syntax produced 
activations in the inferior frontal cortex. The latter instead produced responses in bilateral 
parietal brain regions. Finally, Maruyama et al. (2012) manipulated the syntactic 
complexity of algebraic operations and also found activations in parietal (and occipital) 
regions, but not within the fronto-temporal language system. 
 
In summary, it appears that brain regions that respond robustly during linguistic 
processing are not generally (cf. Trbovich & LeFevre, 2003) active when we solve 
arithmetic problems. Furthermore, damage – even extensive damage – to the language 
regions appears to leave intact our arithmetic abilities. We therefore conclude that 
linguistic processing occurs in brain circuits distinct from those that support arithmetic 
processing. 
 
2.2 Language vs. logical reasoning and other executive functions 
 
In addition to our ability to exchange thoughts with one another via language, humans 
differ from other animals in the complexity of our thought processes (e.g., Gray & 
Thompson, 2004). In particular, we are experts in organizing our thoughts and actions 
according to internal goals. This structured behavior has been linked with a large number 
of theoretical constructs, including working memory, cognitive control, attention, and 
fluid intelligence (e.g., Miller & Cohen, 2001; Duncan, 2010, 2012). What is the 
relationship between these so-called “executive functions” and the language system? 
 
There are at least two reasons to suspect an important link. The first has to do with the 
anatomical substrates of executive control. In particular, prefrontal cortex has long been 
argued to be important (e.g., Miller & Cohen, 2001). Although, over the years, additional 
brain regions have been incorporated into the cognitive control “network”, including 
regions in the parietal cortices, frontal lobes continue to figure prominently in any 
account of cognitive control and goal-directed behavior. Critically, as has long been 
known, some of the language-responsive regions occupy parts of the left inferior frontal 
cortex. One possibility is that language processing at least partially relies on domain-
general circuits in the left frontal lobe (e.g., Kaan & Swaab, 2002; Novick et al., 2005). 
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The second reason concerns the functional importance of cognitive control and working 
memory for language. We have long known that these domain-general mechanisms play 
a role in language processing (e.g., see Fedorenko, 2014, for a recent review). For 
example, super-additive processing difficulties have been reported when participants 
perform a language task at the same time as a demanding working memory or inhibitory 
task (e.g., Gordon et al., 2002; Fedorenko et al., 2006). And in fMRI studies, a number of 
groups have reported activation in these domain-general frontal and parietal circuits for 
some linguistic manipulations, especially for manipulations of linguistic difficulty (e.g., 
Rodd et al., 2005; Novais-Santos et al., 2007; January et al., 2009). This suggests that 
cognitive control mechanisms can and do sometimes support language processing, much 
like they support the processing of information in other domains. 
 
So, how is this relationship between language and cognitive control implemented? Is 
there partial, or even complete, overlap between these functions in the left frontal lobe, or 
does language rely on brain regions that are distinct from those that support cognitive 
control? 
 
In one fMRI study (Fedorenko et al., 2011), we identified language-responsive brain 
regions and then examined the responses of those regions when participants performed 
several classic working memory / inhibitory tasks. As expected, the language regions in 
the temporal lobe showed no response during these executive tasks (Fig. 2). However, 
importantly, the language regions in the left frontal lobe (including in and around Broca’s 
area) showed a similar degree of selectivity, in spite of the fact that executive tasks 
robustly activated left frontal cortex in close proximity to the language-responsive 
regions (Fedorenko et al., 2012a). 
 
Other fMRI studies provided additional support for the idea that language regions, 
including those in the inferior frontal cortex, are highly selective in function. For 
example, Monti et al. (2007, 2009) have examined the relationship between linguistic 
processing and logical reasoning, another ability that strongly draws on domain-general 
cognitive control resources (e.g., Goel, 2007), and found largely non-overlapping 
responses, with the language regions responding strongly during the processing of 
language stimuli and much less so during the processing of logical expressions. 
 
Data from patients with brain damage generally support the conclusions drawn from 
brain imaging studies. For example, Varley & Siegal (2000) report a severely agrammatic 
aphasic man who was able to perform well on complex causal reasoning tasks. 
Furthermore, anecdotally, some of the severely aphasic patients that Varley and 
colleagues have studied over the years continue to play chess in spite of experiencing 
severe comprehension / production difficulties. And chess is arguably the epitome of 
human intelligence / reasoning, with high demands on attention, working memory, 
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planning, deductive reasoning, inhibition, etc. On the flip side, Reverberi et al. (2009) 
found that patients with extensive lesions in prefrontal cortex and preserved linguistic 
abilities exhibited impairments in deductive reasoning. Thus, an intact linguistic system 
is not sufficient for reasoning. 
 
It is worth noting that at least one patient investigation has argued that language is, in 
fact, necessary for complex reasoning. In particular, using the Wisconsin Card Sorting 
Task (Berg, 1948), Baldo et al. (2005) reported impairments in aphasic individuals, but 
not in patients with left-hemisphere damage but without aphasia. A plausible explanation 
for this pattern of results is that language regions lie in close proximity to domain-general 
cognitive control regions. This is true not only in the left frontal cortex, as discussed 
above (e.g., Fedorenko et al., 2012a), but also in the left temporo-parietal cortex. Thus, 
brain damage that results in aphasia is more likely to affect these nearby cognitive control 
structures than brain damage that does not lead to aphasia (and is thus plausibly further 
away from the cognitive control regions). As noted above, dissociations are more 
powerful than associations (e.g., Coltheart, 1985; Shallice, 1988), so the fact that there 
exist severely aphasic individuals who have intact executive functions constitutes strong 
evidence for the language system not being critical to those functions. 
 
In summary, although both executive functions and language processing robustly engage 
brain structures in the left frontal cortex, they appear to occupy nearby but distinct 
regions within that general area of the brain, as evidenced by clear dissociations observed 
in fMRI studies and the preserved abilities of at least some severely aphasic individuals 
to engage in complex non-linguistic reasoning tasks. 
 
2.3 Language vs. Theory of Mind 
 
A sophisticated ability to take the subtleties of another’s mental states into consideration 
when acting in the world, Theory of Mind (ToM), is yet another defining characteristic of 
humans (e.g., Saxe, 2006). Some have argued that certain linguistic (specifically, 
grammatical) representations are necessary for thinking about others’ minds (e.g., de 
Villiers, 2000; de Villers & de Villers, 2000). Indeed, some evidence seems to support 
this contention. First, linguistic abilities (including both syntax and understanding 
meanings of mental state verbs like “think” and “believe”) correlate with success on false 
belief tasks (e.g., Astington & Jenkins, 1999; Dunn et al. 1991; Astington & Baird, 2005; 
Milligan et al. 2007; Wellman et al. 2001). Furthermore, training children with no 
understanding of false beliefs on certain linguistic constructions allows them to pass the 
false-belief task (e.g., Appleton & Reddy, 1996; Clements et al., 2000; Hale & Tager-
Flusberg, 2003; Slaughter & Gopnik, 1996). However, we are here concerned with adult 
brains, and even if linguistic representations were critical for the development of (at least 
some aspects) of ToM, it is still possible that in a mature brain linguistic representations 
are no longer necessary. 
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Recent research in social neuroscience has identified a set of brain regions that appear to 
play a role in representing others’ internal states, including thoughts, preferences, and 
feelings (e.g., Fletcher et al., 1995; Gallagher et al., 2000; Vogeley et al., 2001; Ruby and 
Decety, 2003; Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003; Ciaramidaro et al., 2007; Gobbini et al., 2007). 
These regions include right and left temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), the precuneus, and 
regions in medial prefrontal cortex. The right TPJ, in particular, is highly selective for 
thinking about someone else’s thoughts and beliefs (Saxe and Wexler, 2005; Saxe and 
Powell, 2006; Perner et al., 2006; Young and Saxe, 2009; Jenkins and Mitchell, 2009; 
Bedny et al., 2009), in line with both a) early patient studies that showed that damage to 
this region led to deficits in ToM reasoning (Siegal, Carrington and Radel, 1996; Happé, 
Brownell & Winner, 1999), and b) recent ‘virtual lesion’ TMS experiments (e.g., Kalbe 
et al., 2010; Young et al., 2010). 
 
The fact that the apparently core (most functionally selective) region within the ToM 
network – the right TPJ – is located in the non-language-dominant hemisphere already 
suggests that the language system is probably not critical for ToM reasoning. However, 
the left TPJ is still an important component of the network (e.g., Samson, Apperly, 
Chiavarino, & Humphreys, 2004), and a recent study reported overlap between the left 
TPJ and the language regions (Deen et al., 2015). However, numerous experiments with 
aphasic patients who suffered extensive damage to the left TPJ indicate retained ToM 
reasoning and residual insights into the knowledge states of others (Dronkers et al., 1998; 
Varley & Siegal, 2000; Varley, Siegal & Want, 2001; Apperly, Samson, Carroll, Hussian 
& Humphreys, 2006; Willems, Benn, Hagoort, Toni, & Varley, 2011). Typical probes of 
ToM, such as the changed location or changed contents tasks, involve inferences 
regarding the beliefs of others. In standard formats these tasks place heavy demands on 
linguistic processing. For example, the participant must detect the third person reference 
of the probe question and make fine semantic discriminations between verbs such as 
‘think/know’. However, when people with severe agrammatic aphasia are given cues as 
to the purpose of the probe questions, they reveal retained ability in inferring the beliefs 
(both true and false) of others (Varley & Siegal, 2000). Willems et al., (2011) extended 
these observations to people with global aphasia. They employed a non-linguistic task in 
which there was a mismatch in knowledge between participants as to the location and 
orientation of two tokens on a grid. The informed participant (the ‘sender’) had to 
recognize the knowledge state of the naïve ‘receiver’ and then, using their own token, 
signal the location/orientation of the receiver’s token. Participants with severe aphasia 
were able to adopt both sender and receiver roles: as senders, they recognized the 
receiver’s need for information and designed a message to convey the necessary 
knowledge. As receivers, they were able to interpreting the intentions behind movement 
of a token in order to correctly locate and orientate their token. Thus, although the 
potential theoretical significance of the overlap observed between language 
comprehension and Theory of Mind tasks in the left TPJ remains to be investigated, it 
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appears that the language system is not critical for mentalizing, at least once the 
mentalizing abilities have developed. 
 
2.4 Language vs. music processing 
 
Language and music – two universal cognitive abilities unique to humans (e.g., 
McDermott & Hauser, 2005) – have  been observed to share similarities. Apart from the 
obvious surface-level similarity, with both involving temporally unfolding sequences of 
sounds with a salient rhythmic and melodic structure (e.g., Handel, 1989; Patel, 2008), 
there is a deeper parallel: language and music exhibit similar structural properties, as has 
been noted for many years (e.g., Riemann, 1877, as cited in Swain, 1995; Lindblom & 
Sundberg, 1970; Fay, 1971; Bernstein, 1976; Sundberg & Lindblom, 1976; Lerdahl & 
Jackendoff, 1977, 1983; Roads, 1979; Krumhansl & Keil, 1982).  In particular, in both 
domains relatively small sets of elements (words in language, notes and chords in music) 
are used to create a large, perhaps infinite, number of sequential structures (phrases and 
sentences in language, and melodies in music). And in both domains, this combinatorial 
process is constrained by a set of rules, such that healthy adult humans can judge the 
well-formedness of typical sentences and melodies. 
 
Inspired by these similarities, many researchers have looked for evidence of overlap in 
the processing of structure in language and music. For example, a number of studies have 
used a structural-violation paradigm where participants listen to stimuli in which the 
presence of a structurally unexpected element is manipulated. For example, some early 
studies used event-related potentials (ERPs) and showed that structural violations in 
music elicit components that resemble those elicited by syntactic violations in language.  
These include the P600 (e.g., Janata, 1995; Patel et al., 1998; Fitzroy & Sanders, 2013; 
see Osterhout & Holcomb, 1993; Hagoort et al., 1993, for the original reports of the P600 
response to syntactic violations in language), and the early anterior negativity, present 
more strongly in the right hemisphere (eRAN; e.g., Patel et al., 1998; Koelsch et al., 
2000; Loui et al., 2005; Miranda & Ullman, 2007; see Neville et al., 1991; Friederici, 
Pfeifer & Hahne, 1993, for the original reports of the eLAN in response to syntactic 
violations in language; see Steinhauer & Drury, 2012, for a recent critical evaluation of 
the eLAN findings). Later studies observed a similar effect in MEG and suggested that it 
originates in or around Broca’s area and its right-hemisphere homologue (e.g., Maess et 
al., 2001).  Subsequently, fMRI studies also identified parts of Broca’s area as one of the 
generators of the effect (Koelsch et al., 2002; Tillmann et al., 2003, 2006; see Herdener et 
al, 2012, for similar evidence from rhythmic violations), although other regions were also 
implicated, including ventrolateral premotor cortex (e.g., Koelsch, 2006), insular cortex, 
parietal regions (e.g., Koelsch et al., 2002; Tillman et al., 2003), and superior temporal 
regions (e.g., Koelsch et al., 2002; see also Sammler et al., 2009, 2013, for evidence from 
intracranial EEG recordings). 
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A number of behavioral dual-task studies have also argued for language-music overlap 
based on super-additive processing difficulty when musical violations coincided with 
syntactic violations in language (e.g., Fedorenko et al., 2009; Slevc et al., 2009; Hoch et 
al., 2011; cf. Bonnel et al., 2001). Some patient studies have also been taken to support 
overlap, notably those investigating musical processing in aphasic patients with lesions in 
Broca’s area.  Patel et al. (2008) found subtle deficits in processing musical structure, 
which – as the authors acknowledge – could also be attributed to lower-level auditory 
processing deficits.  And Sammler et al. (2011) observed an abnormal scalp distribution 
of the eRAN component and subtle behavioral deficits in patients with IFG lesions. 
 
However, in spite of the intuitive appeal of the music/language overlap idea, we will 
argue that there is an alternative interpretation of the results summarized above, which a 
few of the studies have already alluded to (e.g., Tillmann et al., 2006). In particular, a 
note or word that is incongruent with the preceding musical or syntactic context is a 
salient event. As a result, the observed responses to such deviant events could reflect a 
generic mental process – such as attentional capture, detection of violated expectations, 
or error correction – that a) applies equally to language, music, and other, non-musical 
and non-linguistic, domains, and b) does not necessarily have to do with processing 
complex, hierarchically-structured materials. A closer look at the available evidence 
supports this interpretation. 
 
The P600 ERP component that is sensitive to syntactic violations in language and music 
is also sensitive to violations of expectations in other domains, including arithmetic 
(Niedeggen & Rosler, 1999; Núñez-Peña & Honrubia, 2004) and sequential learning of 
complex structured sequences (Christiansen et al., 2012). For example, Niedeggen & 
Rosler (1999) observed a P600 in response to violations of multiplication rules, and 
Núñez-Peña & Honrubia (2004) observed a P600 to violations of a sequence of numbers 
that were generated following an easy-to-infer rule (e.g., adding 3 to each preceding 
number - e.g., 3 6 9 12 15 19). Furthermore, although studies manipulating both syntactic 
and semantic structure in language argued that structural processing in music selectively 
interferes with syntactic processing in language (e.g., Besson & Schon, 2001; Slevc et al., 
2009), more recent studies suggest that structural processing in music can interfere with 
both syntactic and semantic processing in language (Hoch et al., 2011; Perruchet & 
Poulin-Charronnat, 2013), arguing against a syntax-specific interpretation. 
 
Given that language, music, and arithmetic all rely on complex structured representations, 
responses to violations in these domains could nonetheless index some sort of cross-
domain high-level structural processing. However, unexpected events that do not violate 
structural expectations also appear to elicit similar ERP components. For example, 
Coulson and colleagues (1998a,b) have argued that the P600 component is an instance of 
another, highly domain-general, ERP component, the P300 component (also referred to 
as the “P3”), which has long been known to be sensitive to rare and/or informative events 
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irrespective of high-level structure (e.g., Pritchard, 1981). Kolk and colleagues have also 
argued for a domain-general interpretation of the P600 component (e.g., Kolk & Chwilla, 
2007). For example, Vissers et al. (2006) have observed a P600 for spelling errors 
(“fone” instead of “phone”), which seems unlikely to involve anything we might call 
abstract structural processing. 
 
Some uncertainty also exists with respect to the relationship between the eRAN 
component (e.g., Koelsch et al., 2000) and the mismatch negativity (MMN) component.  
The MMN component is observed when a stimulus violates a rule established by the 
preceding sequence of sensory stimuli (Näätänen et al., 1978; see Garrido et al., 2009 and 
Trainor & Zatorre, 2009 for recent overviews). Most of the work on the MMN has 
focused on the auditory domain (see e.g., Näätänen et al., 2007 for a review), but several 
studies have reported a visual MMN (e.g., Cammann, 1990; Astikainen et al., 2004; 
Czigler et al., 2004). In the auditory domain, although early studies employed relatively 
low-level manipulations (e.g., a repeated tone in a sequence of ascending tones (e.g., 
Tervaniemi et al., 1994), or a switch in the direction of a within-pair frequency change 
(Saarinen et al., 1992)), later studies have observed the MMN component for more 
abstract manipulations, such as violations of tonal (e.g., Trainor et al., 2002; Neuloh & 
Curio, 2004; Fujioka et al., 2005) or rhythmic (e.g., Vuust et al., 2005; van Zuijen et al., 
2004) patterns, raising questions about how this component might relate to the eRAN. 
Some ERP studies have explicitly argued that eRAN is distinct from the MMN, with 
eRAN exhibiting a longer latency and a larger amplitude than the MMN (e.g., Koelsch et 
al., 2001; cf. Leino et al., 2007, who report a longer latency for the MMN than for 
eRAN), and with different dominant sources (posterior IFG for eRAN and primary 
auditory cortex for the MMN; Garza Villarreal et al., 2011). However, a number of other 
studies have reported multiple sources for the MMN, including both temporal and frontal 
components (see Alain et al., 1998 for the patient evidence implicating the frontal 
source). According to one proposal (Giard et al., 1990; also Gomot et al., 2000; Maess et 
al., 2007), two mental processes contribute to the MMN: a) a sensory memory 
mechanism (located in the temporal lobe; e.g., Schoenwisner et al., 2007), and b) an 
attention-switching process (located in the frontal lobes), which has been shown to peak 
later than the temporal component (Rinne et al., 2000). 
 
In summary, two ERP components (the P600 and the early anterior negativity) have been 
linked to structural processing in music and language, and controversy exists for both of 
them regarding their interpretation and their relationship to components driven by 
relatively low-level deviants (P3 and MMN, respectively). This raises the possibility that 
responses thought to be the signature of structural processing in music and language may 
instead reflect domain-general cognitive processes that have little to do specifically with 
processing structure in music and other domains. 
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A similar picture emerges in neuroimaging studies. For example, Koelsch et al. (2005) 
demonstrated that timbre violations activate regions in the posterior IFG and superior 
temporal cortices that are similar to those activated by violations of tonal structure (see 
also Doeller et al., 2003; Opitz et al., 2002; Tillmann et al., 2003).  Furthermore, a meta-
analysis of activation peaks from fMRI studies investigating brain responses to 
unexpected sensory events (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002) reveals a set of brain regions that 
rather closely resemble those activated by structural violations in music (Fig. 3). 
 
 
 
Figure 3. (a) The activation map for a contrast of structural violation vs. no structural 
violation in music from Koelsch et al. (2005, Fig. 2b). (b) The results of a meta-analysis 
of low-level unexpected events from Corbetta & Shulman (2002). 
 
The frontal regions (including parts of Broca’s area; Fedorenko et al., 2012a) and parietal 
regions that are present in both the activation map for the presence vs. absence of a 
structural violation in music, and Corbetta & Shulman’s (2002) meta-analysis of 
activation peaks for unexpected events, have long been implicated in a wide range of 
cognitive demands, as discussed in Section 2.2 (e.g., Duncan, 2010, 2012). 
 
In summary, evidence from the structural-violation paradigm is at present largely 
consistent with an interpretation in which the effects arise within domain-general brain 
regions that respond to unexpected events across domains (cf. Wang et al., 2015), 
including cases where the violations presumably have little to do with combinatorial 
processing or with complex hierarchical relationships among elements. 
 
The structural-violation paradigm, albeit popular, has not, however, been the only 
paradigm used to study structural processing: another paradigm in music research that has 
been used to examine sensitivity to different types of structure involves comparing brain 
responses to intact and “scrambled” music. Scrambled variants of music are obtained by 
randomly rearranging segments of sound or elements of music, disrupting different types 
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of musical structure depending on how the scrambling is performed. Comparisons of 
brain activity elicited by intact and scrambled music can thus be used to coarsely probe 
neural sensitivity to musical structure. 
 
Using fMRI, Levitin & Menon (2003, 2005) compared brain responses to intact music 
and scrambled music generated by randomly reordering short segments of the musical 
sound waveform. They reported activation in the inferior frontal gyrus, around BA47, for 
the contrast of intact vs. scrambled music. Based on previous reports of high-level 
linguistic manipulations activating parts of BA47 (e.g., Fiez et al., 1995; Binder et al., 
1997; Dapretto & Bookheimer, 1999), Levitin & Menon argued that the linguistic 
processes that engage parts of BA47 also function to process musical structure. However, 
they did not directly compare the processing of structure in music and language, leaving 
open the possibility that language and music manipulations could activate nearby but 
non-overlapping regions in the anterior parts of the inferior frontal gyrus. 
 
Later studies that directly compared structured and unstructured language and music 
stimuli (Fedorenko et al., 2011; Rogalsky et al., 2011) in fact found little or no response 
to music in brain regions that are sensitive to the presence of structure in language, 
including regions in the left frontal lobe (Fedorenko et al., 2011; Norman-Haignere et al., 
in prep.; Fig. 2). Furthermore, in our recent work (Fedorenko et al., 2012b; see also 
Norman-Haignere et al., 2015), we reported several brain regions in the temporal cortices 
that respond more strongly to structured than unstructured musical stimuli (we randomly 
re-ordered the notes within pieces of music, disrupting most aspects of musical structure) 
but do not show sensitivity to the presence of structure in language stimuli. It therefore 
appears that distinct sets of brain regions support high-level linguistic vs. music 
processing. 
 
This non-overlap is consistent with the dissociation between linguistic and musical 
abilities that has frequently been reported in the neuropsychological literature. In 
particular, patients that experience some difficulty with aspects of musical processing as 
a result of an innate or acquired disorder appear to have little or no trouble with high-
level linguistic processing (e.g., Allen, 1878; Polk & Kertesz, 1993; Peretz, 1993; Peretz 
et al., 1994; Samson & Zatorre, 1994; Steinke et al., 1997; Griffiths et al., 1997; 
Liegeois-Chauvel et al., 1998; Patel et al., 1998; Wilson & Pressing, 1999; Piccirilli et 
al., 2000; Steinke et al., 2001; Wilson et al., 2002; Di Pietro et al., 2004; Warrier & 
Zatorre, 2004; Stewart et al., 2006; Phillips-Silver et al., 2011; see Peretz & Coltheart, 
2003; Peretz & Hyde, 2003 for reviews). And conversely, aphasic patients – even those 
with severe language deficits – appear to have little or no difficulties with music 
perception (e.g., Brust, 1980; Marin, 1982; Basso & Capitani, 1985; Polk & Kertesz, 
1993; Fedorenko et al., 2014). Perhaps the most striking case is that of the Russian 
composer Shebalin who suffered two left hemisphere strokes, the second of which left 
him severely aphasic. Shebalin nevertheless continued to compose music following his 
Authors’ pre-publication proof. Please cite as: 
Fedorenko, E., & Varley, R. (2016). Language and thought are not the same thing: Evidence from 
neuroimaging and neurological patients. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences. 1369, 132-
153.doi:10.1111/nyas.13046 
 
 
 17 
strokes, deemed to be comparable in quality to the music he composed before sustaining 
brain damage (Luria et al., 1965). 
 
In summary, recent brain imaging studies suggest that non-overlapping sets of brain 
regions are sensitive to the presence of structure in language vs. music (Fedorenko et al., 
2011; Rogalsky et al., 2011; Fedorenko et al., 2012b). These findings are consistent with 
evidence from brain-damaged populations. We therefore conclude that linguistic 
processing occurs in brain circuits distinct from those that support music processing. 
 
2.5. Language vs. spatial navigation 
 
The claim for a role for language in cross-domain integration has been explored in the 
area of navigation and reorientation. The environment provides a number of cues to 
location, including both geometric and landmark information. If these cues are processed 
by separate mechanisms (such as those dedicated to visuo-spatial processing and object 
recognition), it might be that only in the presence of relevant language forms that the two 
informational streams can be integrated, creating a capacity for flexible reorientating 
behaviour. Initial experimental findings supported this claim. Cheng (1986) reported that 
rats navigate on the basis of geometric information alone. Similarly, young children who 
had not yet mastered spatial language of the type ‘right/left of X’ also relied on the 
geometry of the environment (Hermer & Spelke, 1996). Furthermore, in a striking 
demonstration of the possible role of language, healthy adults when engaged in verbal 
shadowing failed to combine available landmark and geometric cues and attempted to 
reorient on the basis of geometric information alone (Hermer-Vazquez, Spelke, & 
Katsnelson, 1999). The capacity to incorporate landmark information into reorientation 
performance appeared to require linguistic resources. 
 
Subsequent experiments did not always replicate these findings. For example, 
investigations with non-human species such as monkeys and fish revealed capacity to 
combine landmarks and geometry (Gouteux, Thinus-Blanc, & Vauclair, 2001; Sovrano, 
Bisazza, & Vallortigara, 2002). Learmonth, Newcombe and Huttenlocher (2001) found 
no effect of verbal shadowing when the dimensions of the search space were increased, 
indicating that reorientation in small search spaces is particularly vulnerable to 
disruption. Patients with global aphasia who had difficulties in comprehension and use of 
spatial terms both in isolation and in sentences were indistinguishable in reorientation 
performance from healthy controls (Bek, Blades, Siegal & Varley, 2010). These 
individuals were unable to produce terms such as ‘left’ or ‘right’, and made errors in 
understanding simple spatial phrases such as ‘the match to the left of the box’. Despite 
these linguistic impairments, they were able to integrate landmark information (e.g., the 
blue wall) with ambiguous geometric information in order locate hidden objects.  
. One possibility is that while language can be used to draw attention to particular aspects 
of an environment, other forms of cue can also perform this role. Shusterman, Lee and 
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Spelke (2011) undertook a detailed exploration of the impact of different forms of verbal 
cues on the reorientation behavior of 4-year old children. They observed that a non-
spatial linguistic cue that served only to direct a child’s attention to landmark information 
was as effective in improving reorientation performance as verbal cues incorporating 
spatial information. This result suggests that, rather than language representations being a 
mandatory resource for informational integration, they provide more general scaffolding 
to learning. Furthermore, language is not the only resource to support attention to 
significant cues. Twyman, Friedman and Spetch (2007) report that non-linguistic training 
also supports children by drawing their attention to landmark information and enabling its 
combination  with geometry in reorientation. 
 
In a functional neuroimaging study of neural mechanisms that are associated with 
reorientation, Sutton, Twyman, Joanisse and Newcombe (2012) observed bilateral 
hippocampal activation during reorientation in virtual reality environments. Hippocampal 
activity increased in navigation of smaller spaces, confirming  behavioral observations 
that reorientation in environments without distant visual cues is particularly challenging. 
Sutton et al. also report activations of perisylvian language regions including the left 
superior temporal and supramarginal gyri in conditions where environments contained 
ambiguous geometric information but no landmark cues. One interpretation of this result 
is that language resources are employed by healthy adults under conditions of cognitive 
challenge in order to support performance in intrinsically non-linguistic domains. For 
example, through encoding to linguistic forms, sub-elements of a problem can be 
represented and maintained in phonological working memory. However, the finding that 
informational integration is possible in profoundly aphasic adults indicates that language 
representations are not a mandatory component of reorientation reasoning. Klessinger, 
Szczerbinski & Varley (2012) provide a similar demonstration of use of language 
resources in support of calculation in healthy adults. Whereas competent calculators 
showed little evidence of phonological mediation in solving two-digit + two-digit 
addition problems, less competent calculators displayed phonological length effects (i.e., 
longer calculation times on problems with phonologically long vs short numbers). Thus, 
across a range of cognitive domains, language representations might be used in support of 
reasoning, particularly under conditions of high demand.  
 
 
3. Functional specificity places constraints on possible mechanisms 
 
The key motivation for investigating the degree of functional specialization in the human 
mind and brain is that such investigations critically constrain the hypothesis space of 
possible computations of each relevant brain region (e.g., Kanwisher, 2010). If only a 
particular stimulus or class of stimuli produce a response in some brain region, we would 
entertain fundamentally different hypotheses about what this region does, compared to a 
case where diverse stimuli produce similarly robust responses. For example, had we 
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found a brain region within the high-level language processing language system that 
responded similarly strongly1 during the processing of linguistic and musical stimuli, we 
could have hypothesized that this region is sensitive to some abstract features of the 
structure present in both kinds of stimuli (for example, dependencies among the relevant 
elements: words in language, tones and chords in music; or perhaps the engagement of a 
recursive operation). That would tell us that, at some level, we extract these highly 
abstract representations from these – very different on the surface – stimuli. The 
importance of these abstract representations / processes could then be evaluated in 
understanding the overall cognitive architecture of music and language processing. 
Similar kinds of inferences could be made in cases of observed overlap between language 
and other cognitive processes. 
 
The fact that high-level language processing brain regions appear to not be active during 
a wide range of non-linguistic tasks suggests that these regions respond to some features 
that are only present in linguistic stimuli. We hypothesize that the language system stores 
our language knowledge representations. The precise nature of linguistic representations 
is still a matter of debate in the field of language research, although most current 
linguistic frameworks assume a tight relationship between the lexicon and grammar (e.g., 
Joshi, Levy, & Takahashi, 1975; Bresnan, 1982; Schabes, Abeille, & Joshi, 1988; Pollard 
& Sag, 1994; Goldberg, 1995; Bybee, 1998; Jackendoff, 2002, 2007; Culicover & 
Jackendoff, 2005; cf. earlier proposals like Jackendoff, 1977; Chomsky, 1981). Whatever 
their nature is though, detecting matches between the input and stored language 
knowledge is what plausibly leads to neural activity within the language system during 
language comprehension, and searching for and selecting the relevant language units to 
express ideas is what plausibly leads to neural activity during language production. 
 
 
4. Issues that often get conflated with the question of functional specialization 
 
The question of whether in the adult human brain there exist brain regions that are 
specialized for linguistic processing is sometimes conflated with and tainted by several 
issues that – albeit interesting and important – are nonetheless orthogonal (see e.g., 
Elman et al., 1996, for earlier discussions). We here attempt to briefly clarify a few such 
issues. 
 
First, the existence of specialized language machinery does not imply the innateness of 
such machinery (see e.g., Karmiloff-Smith, 1992; Elman et al., 1996 for discussion). 
                                                 
1 It is worth noting that effect sizes are sometimes not appreciated enough in fMRI studies, which often 
focus on the significance of the effects. In some cases, two manipulations, A and B, may produce 
significant effects in a particular brain region, but if manipulation A produces a response that is several 
times stronger than manipulation B, this is critical for interpreting the role of the region in question in the 
cognitive processes targeted by the two manipulations. 
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Functional specialization can develop as a function of our experience with the world. A 
clear example is the visual word-form area, vWFA, a region in the inferior temporal 
cortex that responds selectively to letters in one’s native script (e.g., Baker et al., 2007). 
Recent experiments with macaques have also suggested that specialized circuits can 
develop via an experiential route (Srihasam et al., 2011). Given that language is one of 
the most frequent and salient stimuli in our environment from birth (and even in utero) 
and throughout our lifetimes, it is computationally efficient to develop machinery that is 
specialized for processing linguistic stimuli. In fact, our hypothesis introduced in Section 
3 – that the fronto-temporal language system stores linguistic knowledge representations 
– is actually not compatible with the idea that our language machinery is present at birth. 
 
It remains an important open question what the regions that in the adult brain show 
selectivity for high-level linguistic processing do prior to or at birth. A number of studies 
have reported responses to human speech in young infants characterized by at least some 
degree of selectivity over non-speech sounds and, in some cases, selectivity for native 
language over other languages (e.g., Dehaene-Lambertz et al., 2002; Dehaene-Lambertz 
et al., 2010; Kuhl et al., 2014; Schultz et al., 2014; cf. Christia et al., 2014). However, it 
is not clear whether these responses extend beyond the high-level auditory regions that 
are selective for speech processing in the adult brain but are not sensitive to the 
meaningfulness of the signal (e.g., Norman-Haignere et al., 2015). In any case, as noted 
above, infants have exposure to speech in the womb (e.g., Moon & Fifer, 2000), and 
some studies have shown sensitivity to sounds experienced prenatally shortly after birth 
(e.g., Partanen et al., 2013). As a result, even if speech responses in the infants occur in 
what-later-become high-level language processing regions, it is possible that these 
responses are experientially driven. Humans are endowed with sophisticated learning 
mechanisms and acquire a variety of complex knowledge structures and behaviors early 
in life. As a result, in order to postulate an innate capacity for language, or any other 
cognitive ability, strong evidence is required. 
 
Second, the existence of specialized language machinery is orthogonal to whether and 
how this system interacts with other cognitive and neural systems. Most researchers these 
days – ourselves included – do not find plausible the idea that the language system is in 
some way encapsulated (cf. Fodor, 1981). However, how the language system exchanges 
information with other large-scale neural networks remains another important question 
for future research. Furthermore, the fact that there exist some brain regions that are 
specialized for language processing does not imply that it cannot additionally draw on 
domain-general resources, and in turn itself act as a co-opted/non-mandatory domain-
general resource (2.5). In fact, as noted in Section 2.2, a number of linguistic 
manipulations have been shown to recruit the regions of the fronto-parietal executive 
system (see also Fedorenko, 2014, for a recent discussion). 
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Third, the specificity of the language system does not imply that the relevant brain 
regions evolved specifically for language. This possibility cannot be excluded, but the 
evidence available to date does not unequivocally support it. In particular, although a 
number of researchers have argued that some brain regions in the human brain are not 
present in non-human primates (e.g., ***), others have suggested that a human brain is 
simply a scaled up versions of a non-human primate brain (e.g., Herculano-Houzel, 
2012). Regardless of whether or not the human brain includes any species-specific 
regions, relative to the brains of our primate relatives humans possess massively 
expanded association cortices in the frontal, temporal and parietal regions (e.g., Buckner 
& Krienen, 2013). However, these association cortices house at least three spatially and 
functionally distinct large-scale networks: i) the fronto-temporal language system that we 
have focused on here, ii) the fronto-parietal domain-general cognitive control system 
(e.g., Duncan, 2010), and iii) the so-called “default mode network” (e.g., Buckner et al., 
2008) that overlaps with the Theory of Mind network (e.g., Saxe, 2006) and has been also 
implicated in introspection and creative thinking. The latter two systems are present in 
non-human primates and appear to be structurally and functionally similar (e.g., Duncan, 
2010; Mantini et al., 2011). How exactly the language system emerged against the 
backdrop of these other, not human-specific, high-level cognitive abilities remains a big 
question critical to understanding the evolution of our species. 
 
And fourth, although in the fully formed adult brain damage to the language system does 
not appear to affect non-linguistic abilities, it is possible that in the course of 
development, language is critical for the formation of some cognitive capacities, such as 
our ability to explicitly represent others’ mental states (as discussed in Section 2.3) or 
operate on large exact quantities. To investigate the role of language in the development 
of non-linguistic human capacities, one can a) look at the developmental time-courses of 
the relevant abilities to see if the mastering of particular linguistic devices leads to the 
emergence of the relevant non-linguistic ability, or b) examine the non-linguistic abilities 
in question in children who are delayed in their linguistic development, due to either a 
neurodevelopmental language disorder or lack of early linguistic input (e.g., Curtiss, 
1977; Dronkers et al., 1998). 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
We have here reviewed evidence from brain imaging investigations and studies of 
patients with severe aphasia and argued that language processing relies on a set of 
specialized brain regions, located in the frontal and temporal lobes of the left hemisphere. 
These regions are not active when we engage in arithmetic processing, solve complex 
problems, listen to music, think about other people’s mental states or navigate in the 
world. Furthermore, all these non-linguistic abilities further appear to remain intact 
following damage to the language system, suggesting that linguistic representations are 
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not critical for these abilities. This highly selective functional response profile of the 
language regions suggests to us that these regions store domain-specific knowledge 
representations that mediate our linguistic comprehension and production abilities. The 
specificity of these regions further makes it possible to use them as a functional marker of 
activating linguistic representations, which is important in addressing questions about the 
role of language in various cognitive abilities. 
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